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INSURANCE COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
WILLIAM P. ZUGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the subject of punitive damages. It deals
specifically with the question of whether punitive damages are cov-
ered under a standard automobile or homeowner's liability policy.
Were one to approach the average layman, or the proverbial
"reasonable man," he would probably tell you that he is covered un-
der his automobile and homeowner's policies for whatever damages
may be assessed, up to the policy limits.
On the other hand, most lawyers, I suspect, believe that punitive
damages are excluded from coverage in the typical liability policy.
In my experience this is, also a viewpoint shared at least by most
of those in the insurance industry.
Both the layman and the lawyer would share, I further suspect
belief that the question could readily be answered by reference to
the policy, and if not then, most certainly by reference to the law.
However, the answer is not a simple one. As we will see in this
article, the courts have been wrestling with the question for many
years. After considering the problem in great depth for nearly fifty
years, the courts are still split between two divergent points of view.
The essence of this dichotomy stems from a deep public policy con-
flict. The courts have reached greatly differing conclusions based up-
on identical policy provisions, identical law relating to punitive dam-
ages and identical common law precedent.
The problem of insurance coverage of punitive damages involves
two major issues:
1. Are punitive damages covered by the standard liability policy?
Most of the cases which have reached the courts arose out of the
operation of motor vehicles.' A lesser number dealt with homeown-
er's or other general liability policies.
2
There are distinctions in the treatment by the courts of the iden-
tical language as it exists in the automobile policy, solely by vir-
* B.A., 1969, JD., 1972, University of Minnesota; partner In firm of Zuger and
Bucklin, Bismarek, N.D
I. E.g., American Stir. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (16th Cir. 1966); Hanna v. State
Farm it. Auto Ins. Co., 233 F. Supp. 510 (F.D.S.C. 1964); Laird v. Nationwide In3.
Co., 24:. S.C. 3S8, 134 S.E1.2d 206 (11164).
2. E.1., American Ills. Co. v. Saulnior. 242 F. Supp. 257 '(D. Conn. 1965); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
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tue of the fact that it arises in the automobile context. However, the
langage is basically the same; therefore, the treatment of that lan-
guage by the courts is basically the same.
With few exceptions, the courts agree that the typical liability
policy purports to extend coverage for punitive damages by virtue
of the broad language contained in it:
The matter that troubles the courts is a second, far more com-
plicated issue:
2. Does public policy limit coverage of punitive damages?
On this issue there is much less agreement and it is to this issue
that this article largely is addressed.
II. THE CONCEPT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Obviously, much has been written in the last fifty years concern-
ing punitive damages.4 Virtually all jurisdictions in the United
States allow the awarding of "punitive" or "exemplary" damages
over and above compensation.5
While it has been the object of tort law to provide compensa-
tion for injuries and of criminal law to punish transgressions against
society, most jurisdictions have nonetheless recognized the legitimacy
of the punitive award. Only the states of Louisiana, 6 Massachu-
setts, 7 Nebraska and Washington9 refuse to recognize the legiti-
macy of the punitive damage award.
In addition, three states, New Hampshire, Michigan and Connec-
ticut, hold that punitive damages are actually compensatory in nature
and limit them accordingly. Connecticut provides that in the case
where the elements for punitive damage are shown, attorney's fees
may be awarded to the plaintiff as punishment of the defendant.10
New Hampshire11 and Michigan1 2 allow a form of punitive damages
very similar to the compensatory damages currently found in the
tort of outrage.
With these few exceptions, however, American jurisdictions gen-
3. E.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943)
Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941) ; Scott v. Instant Parking,
Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969) ; Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App.
1964).
4. E.g., Fridman, Punitive Damages in Tort, 48 CAN. B. REV. 373 (1970); Iodgin,
Punitive Dantages-Reassessed, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 119 (1972) ; Tozer', Punitive Da2-
ages and Products Liability, 39 INs. COTNSEL J. 300 (1972).
5. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Nicholson
v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
6. Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949).
7. Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914).
8. Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. R. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935).
9. Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952).
10. Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
11. Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876).
12. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
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erally hold that punitive damages are strictly noncompensatory and
are awarded in addition to full compensation.
The conduct which will justify the award of punitive damages
has been variously defined as involving elements such as "willful-
ness, wantonness, oppression, outrageous conduct, indignity and con-
tumely, insult, or fraud or gross fraud."'1 3 As Dean Prosser observ-
ed, "[S]omething more than the mere commission of the tort is
always required for punitive damages.'
1 4
The courts commonly require some quantum such as "wanton"
or "in reckless disregard."' 15
In this repect, the North Dakota statute is typical and provides:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, when the defendant has been guilty of oppres-
sion, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addi-
tion to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake
of exanple and by way of punishing the defendant.' 6
In Shoemaker v. Sonju,'17 the North Dakota Supreme Court fur-
ther defined malice as follows:
Malice which is presumed or malice in law, as distin-
guished from malice in fact, "is not personal hate or ill will
of one person toward another; it refers to that state of mind
which is reckless of law and of the legal rights of the citi-
zen in a person's conduct toward that citizen."' 8
III. THE INSURANCE POLICY
Most of the cases in which the courts have approached the ques-
tion of whether punitive damages are covered under a liability pol-
icy have dealt with automobile policies. 19 A lesser number have dealt
with homeowner's policies.2
0
Regardless of the type of policy, the standard liability provisions
are essentially the same. Most of the policies discussed in the cases
which follow cover a liability "arising out of bodily injury" or "aris-
ing out of property damage" or similar language.
The typical insurance policy contains a good many exclusions
and has a substantial definitions section. However, surprising as it
13. 22 Am. Jita. 2d D n4flies § 249 (1965).
14. W. PIRORSE, LAI OF TOTS ) (11h ed. 1965).
15. E.Y., Brooks v. WoottI1, 355 F.2d 177 (21 Cir. 1966) ; Sehastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa
9t, 66 N.V.2d 84I ( 1954) : Allman v. Bird, 1S6 Kan, 802, 353 P.2d 216 (1960).
16. N.D. CENT. CODI.- 32-03-07 (143).
17. 15 N.D. 518, 1418 N.W . 42 (1906).
19. Id. at 524, 108 N.V. at 44, quoting 1 J. SUTHERLAND oN DAMAGES § 394, at 852
(2d ed. 1893).
19. See cases cited in note 1 supra.
20. See cases citod in note 2 supra.
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may seem, the standard liability policy, automobile or homeowner's,
contains exceedingly broad language' defining, the basic liability of
the company:
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ... "
This agreement, quoted from the Family Automobile policy, is
to be found in practically identical language in virtually every
liability policy.
2-
The following is the policy language in the leading case on the
subject of coverage of punitive damages, Northwestern National Cas-
ualty Co. v McNulty:
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insur-
ed shall become legally obligated to pay as damages:
A. bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death re-
sulting therefrom, herein called "bodily injury" sustained by
any person:
B. injury to or destruction of property, including loss of
use thereof, thereinafter called "property damage". .22
IV. THE LEADING CASES,
The'two leading cases concerning coverage of punitive damages
are Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 23 and Lazenby
v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.
24
These cases well represent the two general approaches to the
coverage question. Both arose out of automobile occurrences and in-
volved essentially identical policy provisions.25 Both devoted little at-
tention to the question of policy language. Rather, their conclusions
were instead based upon grounds of public policy.
A. Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty
26
McNulty was decided in the United States Court of Appeals for
21. NATIONAL UNDERWRITERS ASS'N., Public Liability, in FIRE, CAS. & SUR. BULLS. §
Cod-1 (May 1974).
22. 307 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962). This is the language, without significant excep-
tion, in all of the cases which were reviewed in preparation of this article, Identified in
the biblliog raphy to this article.
23. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.V.2d 1 (1964).
25. The policy provision in Lazenby provided as follows:
Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liabilty To pay in behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages be-
cause of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time re-
suiting therefrom sustained by any person caused by the accident and arising
out of ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
Id. at 642, 383 S.V.2d at 2. Northwestern Nat'l. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 433
(5th Cir. 1962).
26. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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the Fifth Circuit in 1962. The case arose out of an accident occurring
in Florida and a subsequent suit on a policy written in Virginia.
The policy, issued by the Northwestern National Casualty Company,
was a family combination automobile policy, insuring Walter Smith,
a Virginia resident, in the amount of $50,000.
The lawsuit involved intoxication, high speed driving, and hit and
run on the part of the insured, Smith. Plaintiff, McNulty, suffered
severe personal injuries, including permanent brain damage.
In a lawsuit in a Florida state court, McNulty sued Smith and
recovered a total of $57,500. Of this amount $20,000 was awarded
as punitive damages.
27
Subsequently, McNulty and Smith brought an action in federal
court against Northwestern National Casualty Company to recover
the punitive damages under Smith's liability policy. 28 The trial court
held for plaintiffs -9 and the case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals was apparently presented with both ques-
tions of policy language and public policy. The court never expressly
reached the question of policy coverage, however, finding that public
policy would invalidate coverage, even if it existed under the terms
of the contract. :0
The court observed that "the force of public policy on insurance
covering punitive damages depends on the nature or character of
punitive damages.":" It then went on to analyze the law of Virginia
where the policy was written, and the law of Florida where the ac-
cident occurred. The court found that both states had strong policies
which viewed punitive damages as serving a dual purpose of punish-
ment and deterrence, and stated:
Considering the theory of punitive damages as punitory
and deterrent and accepting as. common knowledge the fact
that death and injury by automobile is a problem far from
solved by traffic regulations and criminal prosecutions, it ap-
pears to us that there are especially strong policy reasons for
not allowing socially irresponsible automobile drivers to es-
cape the element of personal punishment in punitive damages
when they are guilty of reckless slaughter or maiming on the
highway.:-
The court reasoned that coverage of punitive damage would
merely shift the punishment to the insurance company, which had
27. Id. at 433.
7\. Id1.
''. Id. at .134.
d1. 14.
32. 14. at 441.
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done no wrong, and allow the culpable insured to escape the full
burden of punitive damages. In this fashion the insured would escape
the punishment which he deserved and the deterrent effect would be
destroyed. Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the in-
surance company should not be liable for the payment of the puni-
tive damages in this case.
33
B. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.
3 4
The Lazenby case arose out of an automobile accident occurring
in Tennessee and involving an insurance policy written in that state.
While under the influence of alcohol, the insured, Norman Frank
Crutchfield, injured a minor, Frances Jean Lazenby, who then ob-
tained a judgment against Crutchfield in the amount of $4,000.79, in-
cluding $1,087 in punitive damages.5
On refusal of defendant's insurance company to pay punitive
damages, plaintiff brought suit against the insurer, Universal Under-
writers Insurance Company. G
The court in Lazenby not only recognized the existence of the ar-
guments raised in McNulty, but discussed the reasoning of that
case in some detail in arriving at the opposite conclusion.
The court in Lazenby also ignored the question of whether the
policy provided, by its terms, coverage for punitive damages. The
court assumed, without discussion, that these damages were covered
in the policy. It proceeded directly to a discussion of the public pur-
pose questions.
The court observed:
The holding of the court in the McNulty case is based
first on the finding, in Florida and Virginia, that the domi-
nant purpose of punitive damages is not as compensation for
a plaintiff, but rather as punishment for a defendant, and as
a deterrence to him and others from repetition of the wrong-
ful conduct.
37
While the court observed that the Tennessee state courts have
from time to time expressed sentiments questioning the "efficacy
and soundness of the doctrine, ' ' 3 the court concluded:
Although the dominant purpose for the allowance for puni-
tive damages in Tennessee is similar to Florida and Virginia,
33. Id. at 443.
34. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
35. Id. at 641, 383 S.W.2d at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 645, 383 S.1.2d at 4.
38. Id. at 646, 383 S.W.2d at 4.
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as found by the Fifth Circuit Court in the McNulty case, we do
not reach the same conclusion .... 39
In other words, the court in Lazenby grounded its decision not
on the nature or character of punitive damages, but rather on a ba-
sic difference with the McNulty court on the public policy arguments.
The court in Lazenby rested its conclusion upon three primary
grounds. First, Lazenby took issue with the assumption of McNulty
that the imposition of punitive damages acts as a deterrent to wrong-
ful conduct. The court questioned the conclusion that such sanctions
are effective:
This State, in regard to the proper operation of motor ve-
hicles, has a great many detailed criminal sanctions, which
apparently have not deterred this slaughter on our highways
and streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance market,
in the payment 'of punitive damages, would act to deter guil-
ty drivers would in our opinion contain some element of spec-
ulation.
4 0
Second, the court observed that most of the courts which have
considered the question have concluded the language, by its terms,
extends to cover punitive damages. On this basis, the court observ-
ed that a policyholder's reasonable 'expectation would be that he
would be protected against all claims, including punitive damages
claims.
41
Third, the court reasoned that there is not a clear dividing line
between ordinary negligence and negligence of the type justifying an
award of punitive damages, so that any denial on the basis of public
policy would have to be necessarily arbitrary.42
In conclusion, the court observed that public policy is the basis
on which the issue ought to be decided only when public policy is
clear and unequivocal. The court suggested that the public policy
foundations upon which McNulty was grounded were not clear. It
held, therefore, that the language of the policy ought to be construed
according to the ordinary rules of interpretation and construction,
without reference to public policy. 43
McNulty and Lazenby, however, are not the only cases discuss-
ing these questions, nor do these cases exhaust the arguments either
for or against the existence of coverage. While, in total number,
the cases on point are less than forty, 44 the discussion raised in these
cases has been remarkably extensive.
39. Id. at 647, 3S3 S.V.2d at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See cases cited In bibliography to this article.
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V. ARE PUNITIVE DAMAGES COVERED BY THE STANDARD
LIABILITY POLICY?
A. No COVERAGE
Although by far the majority of the courts have either determined
that the policy, by its terms, covers punitive damages or have
simply assumed such coverage without discussion, there have been
a handful of cases which have determined simply that no coverage
exists under such policy language for punitive damages.45
In the Missouri case of Crull v. Gleb,'6 the issue in the trial
court had apparently been whether or not the acts of defendant were
intentional. The policy specifically excluded bodily injury or proper-
ty damage resulting from intentional acts of the insured.
On appeal, the state appellate court observed:
Wanton and reckless conduct may, and often does, include
negligence. Intentional conduct does not. Therefore, wanton
and reckless acts of the insured do not amount, in law, to
intentional acts so as to permit the insurer to deny coverage
under the provision of a clause, in a liability insurance pol-
icy, which provides that it does not provide coverage for in-
jury intentionally caused by insured.47
Nonetheless, the court in Crull held that the policy did not ex-
tend to coverage of punitive damages. It determined, based upon
its reading of the policy, that only compensatory damages were cov-
ered:
There is no language in the policy that provides for the
payment of judgments for punitive damages. The. policy covers
only damages for bodily injury and property damage sustain-
ed by any person. Punitive damages do not fall in this cate-
gory. The $2,000 award of punitive damages to plaintiff was
to punish defendant for his wrongful acts and as a warning
to others. It was not to compensate plaintiff for bodily injury
or property damage. 4
Crull is an interesting case because, even though the court found
no coverage by the literal terms of the policy, it also discussed the
policy questions and expressed some rather strong beliefs that pub-
lic policy also would require a holding of no coverage.
The policy in Crull provided coverage for:
45. Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (19n4): Ca.,persen v.
Webber v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., 298 Minn. 93, 213 X.\\.21 327 (193);
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.V.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118
Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 27S (1928).
46. 382 S.V.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
47. Id. at 22 (citations omitted)..
48. Id. at 23.
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All sums which the insured may become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness, or dis-
ease, including death resulting therefrom, and injury and de-
struction to property arising out of the ownership or use of the
defendant's automobile. .... 49
This language is not essentially different from that of the cases which
have held to the contrary.
Crull simply stands for the proposition that the purpose of the
policy, as expressed in its language, is to protect against compen-
satory damages, as indicated by use of the terms "bodily injury,"
"property damage" -and the like.
B. COVERAGE
The majority of the cases have either held that punitive damages
are covered within the policy terms or have proceeded directly to the
policy question on the assumption that they are covered.
Although most courts consider the public policy to be -the cri-
tical'issue, several courts have simply held that punitive damages
are covered within the policy terms and have not considered the pub-
lic policy questions. 50
The general reasoning behind these cases is that the policy gen-
erally provides that the company will pay "all sums which the in-
sured shall become obligated to pay by reason of liability. . im-
posed upon him by law, (a) for damages . . .sustained . . .by any
person" 51 or that the company will pay for all damages "on account
of bodily injury."
52
The courts which take this point of view reason that punitive
damages cannot be assessed unless actual damages are proved and
that the punitive damages are therefore awarded on account or aris-
ing from "bodily injury," "personal injury" or whatever other term
the policy may use.
As the court observed in Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, "[The
insurance company's] liability to pay such damages arises out of
its voluntary obligation to pay the judgment rendered against said
indemnity." 3 Under this view the courts hold that if the company
had intended to exclude punitive damages, it simply could have
so stated in plain language and that the company will be held by
its use of broader language.
49. Id. at 19.
50. General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1952) ; United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Capital Motor Lines v.
Loring, 23S Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230
Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1933) Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757
(1947) ; Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.V.2d 908 (1965).
51. General Cas. Co. of America %'. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452, 457 (6th Cir. 1952).
52. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, - , 162 So. 103, 106 (1935).
53. 238 Ala. 260, -, 189 So. 897, 899 (1939).
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It might also be effectively argued, although none of these
cases seem to raise the point, that for many years the courts have
been generally holding that the policy language covers punitive dam-
ages and that having taken no steps to clarify or narrow the langu-
age in the light of those decisions, the companies ought to be held
to the broader coverage.
Often there arises the case of the company that has undertak-
en to defend an insured for an action including punitive, as well
as compensatory damages, but which has not given any indication
throughout the course of the litigation that it intends to deny cover-
age for the punitive portion of the damages. In such a case, Commer-
cial Union Insurance Co. v. Reichard,5 4 although the court 'held that
public policy forbade insuring against punitive damages, there was
also dictum to the effect that the company may have been estopped
by its failure to reserve its right to deny coverage for punitive dam-
agesA5
Most of the courts dealing with the subject of estoppel, however,
have observed that estoppel cannot, as a general rule, accomplish
that which public policy expressly forbids2 6 Yet this would be a
viable argument in the case where the court might find nothing
against public policy, yet find that the insurance, policy by its terms
does not extend to the coverage of punitive damages.
Courts have also relied heavily on the expectation of the insured
in determining whether the policy ought to be held to extend cover-
age. Appleman observed:
However, it is clear that the average insured contemplates
protection against claims of any character caused by his
operation of an automobile, not intentionally inflicted. When
so many states have guest statutes in which the test of li-
ability is made to depend upon wilful and wanton conduct,
or when courts, in an effort to get away from contributory
negligence of the plaintiff, permit a jury to find a defendant
guilty of wilful and wanton conduct where the acts would
clearly not fall within the common law definitions of those
terms, the insured expects, and rightfully so, that his liabili-
ty under those circumstances will be protected by is auto-
mobile policy .... 57
It is open to serious question whether the average purchaser of
insurance could even follow Appleman's arguments based on the
guest statute or the effect of contributory negligence, but Appleman's
54. 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
55. Id. at 278.
56. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 528 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern
Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1962).
57. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4312 (1942).
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)asic premise is still a. sound one. Certainly, it never even occurs
to the average insured that there may be a gap in his coverage.
University of North Dakota Professor Ross C. Tisdale, in a sup-
plement to Appleman's commentary, agreed:
It seems strangely inconsistent for an insurer, in one
breath, to admit liability for compensatory damages, and
then to deny liability for that part of an award claimed at-
tributable to reckless or wanton conduct. Mr. Appleman's ar-
guments apply with equal force to punitive damages. In any
event a. court should not aid an insurer which fails to ex-
clude liability for punitive damages. Surely there is nothing
in the insuring clause that would forewarn an insurer that
such was to be the intent of the parties. 8
This reasoning finds further support in a number of cases. 9
It is expected that North Dakota would attach a great signifi-
cance to the reasonable expectations argument, in light of the re-
cent case of Lovas v. St. Paul Insurance Cos.,60 which contained
extremely strong dictum favoring the doctrine of the Iowa case of
C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.61 The court in
C. & J Fertilizer held that the doctrines of reasonable expectations,
unconscionability, and implied warranty control in construction of
an insurance contract.6 2 This decision accorded substantial weight
to the reasonable expectation of the insured in construing the extent
of coverage of a policy of insurance.
In summary, there is little dispute in the courts that general
language such as that found in the family automobile or other simi-
lar policies would provide coverage for punitive damages.
VI. DOES PUBLIC POLICY LIMIT COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES?
As to this question, there is considerably more discussion and
the subject raises several very interesting issues.
A. No COVERAGE
Approximately half of the courts which have considered the ques-
tion have held that public policy forbids coverage of punitive dam-
ages by a general liability policy.
3
58. rd. (Cum. Supp. 1972).
59. Price v. Hartford Accident & Ind. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783
(1973) ; Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965) ; Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriers Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
60. 240 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1976).
61. -Iowa-, 227 N.W.2d 169 (1975).
62. Id. at -, 227 N.W.2d at 176-81.
63. See cases cited in bibliography to this article.
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In American Insurance Co. V. Saulnier " and LoRocco v. New
Jersey Manufacturers Indemnity Insurance Co.,65 the courts simply
held that public policy did not permit coverage of exemplary dam-
ages, without digressing into the premises of such a public policy.
However, with the exception of these two courts, the courts which
have dealt with the question of public policy have generally discussed
it in considerable depth.
The most common justification given in denying coverage is that
punitive damages are intended to punish a wrongdoer for antisocial
conduct and that coverage of punitive damages would insulate an
insured from this punishment and defeat the very policy behind the
awarding of punitive damages. This argument seems to have the
strongest support in the courts. 6 It also seems to be the most sol-
id argument on any critical examination.
A North Dakota case, Yesel v. Watson, cited punishment of the
insured as the basis for its decision that coverage of punitive dam-
ages is forbidden by public policy.67 However, that case involved
not a private insurer or a contract, but a state bonding authority,
created by statute, and limited in its coverage by the legislative en-
actment. Yesel, itself, acknowledges this to be a point of some im-
portance:
The authorities abundantly support the ruling of the trial
court to the effect that one who is liable for the act of an-
other by reason of being surety upon his official bond is not
answerable for punitive damages that might be recoverable
against the wrongdoer ...
We think this rule applies with peculiar force where the
surety is a state fund created by compulsory assessments
against the public corporations served by the insured officers
or employees.
6
In view of the recent shifts in North Dakota law, expressed in
Lovas v. St. Paul Insurance Cos. 69 and in Hughes v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,70 and in view of Yesel's own self-
limiting language, it would not seem likely that Yesel v. Watson
would carry any substantial binding authority for the North Dakota
64. 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965).
65. 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964).
66. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Northwestern Nat'l. Cas.
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard,
262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Fla. 1966) ; Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 553, 18 A.2d
357 (1941) Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964) ; Yesel v. Watson, 58 N.D. 524,
226 N.W. 624 (1929) ; Esmond v. Lisclo, 209 Pa. Super, 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
67. 58 N.D. 524, 529, 226 N.W. 624, 626 (1929).
68. Id. at 528, 226 N.W. at 625.
69. 240 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1976).
70. 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975).
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courts in determining coverage under an insurance contract.
The Arkansas case of Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton,71 express-
ly followed Yesel, but was likewise limited to statutory bonding cov-
erage.
In Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 72 the
Florida court observed:
Punitive damages "blend together the interests of society
and of the aggrieved individual, and are not only a recom-
pense to the sufferer but a punishment to the offender and
an example to the community." While this definition may
seem to lend credence to the belief that punitive damages
also compensate plaintiff for his injuries, we find their over-
riding purpose to be punishment.
73
It might also be noted that most of the courts expressing approv-
al of a punishment rationale or a deterrent rationale adhere to these
policies with considerable conviction.
In American Surety Co. v. Gold,14 Esmond v. Liscio 7 and North-
western National Casualty Co. v. McNulty,76 the courts further based
their determination of public policy upon a fear that coverage of pun-
itive damages would accomplish the opposite effect, that it would
result in a benefit to the wrongdoer, rather than punishment.
These same three cases also expressed the point of view that
coverage of punitive damages would, in effect, simply shift the re-
sponsibility for punitive damages from the wrongdoer to society as
a whole, and accomplish a purpose completely inconsistent with the
objective of punishment. McNulty summed up the reasoning of these
courts as follows:
Considering the theory of punitive damages as punitory
and as a deterrent and accepting as common knowledge the
fact that death and injury by automobile is a problem far
from solved by traffic regulations and criminal prosecutions,
it appears to us that there are especially strong public pol-
icy reasons for not allowing socially irresponsible automobile
drivers to escape the element of personal punishment in puni-
tive damages when they are guilty of reckless slaughter or
maiming on the highway. . . . To make that policy useful
and effective the delinquent driver must not be allowed to
receive a windfall at the expense of purchasers of insurance,
transferring his responsibility for punitive damages to the
very people-the driving public-to whom he is a menace. We
71. 220 Ark. 25, 246 S.W.2d 818 (1952).
72. 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
73. Id. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
74. 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
75. 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
76. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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are sympathetic with the innocent victim here; perhaps there
is no such thing as money damages making him whole. But
his interest in receiving noncompensatory damages is small
compared with the public interest in lessening the toll of in-
jury and death on the highways; and there is such a thing
as state policy to punish and deter by making a wrongdoer
pay.77
Several cases have also been concerned that in shifting the bur-
den of punitive damages, the law would accomplish punishment of
the insurer, which is an innocent party. 78
As the reasoning of the court in McNulty shows, there is a close
identification in the courts between the purposes of punishment and
of deterrence. 79 Most of those courts which have discussed the pun-
ishment purpose of punitive damages have also alluded to the deter-
rent purposes of punitive damages.
There have only been a few courts, however, which have spe-
cifically relied upon the deterrence motive of punitive damages.80
These courts reason that the opportunity to shift the loss to the in-
surance company would defeat the object of punitive damages to de-
ter wrongful conduct.
Although the object of deterrence is, as we shall see, an open
question, the eloquence of the courts in asserting it, as in the fol-
lowing passage from Crull v. Gleb, is sometimes refreshing:
Our highway safety problems have greatly increased.
Death and destruction stalk our roads. The peaceful Sunday
afternoon family drive through the hills has been abandoned
by many as a result of brushes with near death at the hands
of half-baked morons drunkenly weaving in and out of traffic
at 80 or 90 miles per hour.8 1
As noted, McNulty adheres to the position that criminal sanc-
tions alone have proven insufficient to achieve a deterrence of wrong-




A similar number of courts have found that public policy does
77. Id. at 441-42.
78. Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Crull v.
Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964) ; Yesel v. Watson, 58 N.D. 524, 226 N.W. 624 (1929).
79. 307 F.2d 432, 435-41 (5th Cir. 1962).
80. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Northwestern Nat'l. Cas.
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App.
1964) ; Esmond v. Liscin 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
81. 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. App. 1964).
82. 307 F.2d 432, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1962). Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964),
and Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966), also rely upon this reason-
ing.
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not prohibit coverage and in some cases have even reasoned that
the same public policy arguments used against coverage may, when
viewed in a different light, lead to the opposite result.
The courts favoring coverage take issue with the arguments put
forth to obviate coverage, and with considerable persuasive impact.
The court in Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,83 for
instance, took direct issue with the argument that coverage of pun-
itive damages would defeat the role of punishment. The court ob-
served:
These arguments, at first blush, seem to have merit, but
a careful analysis of them reveals several weaknesses. First,
even though the driver is insured for punitive damages he
cannot engage in wanton conduct with impunity. In the in-
stant case, drag racing would subject him to criminal penal-
ties. His insurances rates would soar.
84
The court may well have added that, as any experinced prac-
titioner realizes, many defendants are simply "judgment-proof." A de-
fendant, therefore, might actually benefit by not having coverage as
a result of his own financial irresponsibility.
Insurance coverage is now compulsory in North Dakota15 and
in many other states. 6 Even under the no-fault programs, fault re-
mains the essential manner of rating the insured. Therefore, cover-
age would not, in most cases, result in avoidance of punishment by
the wrongdoer, but rather would make avoidance of that punishment
impossible even for the judgment-proof defendant or bankrupt defen-
dant.
In point of argument, there is no reason that a company could
not provide a clear exclusion in its policy for punitive damages. In
this event, the company, or the purchasing public by way of its rights
to select coverage, could refuse to accept the responsibility for pun-
itive damages and allow it to remain solely with the wrongdoer.
Another interesting argument of considerable merit is raised
in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Donaldson in the case of
Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Insur-
ance Co..7 Chief Justice Donaldson recognized a "collateral public
policy reason for awarding punitive damages: to encourage plaintiffs
to bring suit against defendants who have engaged in antisocial con-
duct." 88
83. 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
84. Id. at - , 502 P.2d at 524.
85. N D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-42 (Supp. 1975).
86. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANa,. § 627.736 (1972)
repealed by Ch. 76-168, § 3 [1976] Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 283, eff. July 1, 1982. ; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3101 (Supp. 1976).
87. 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973).
88. Id. at -, 511 P.2d at 791.
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There should be no serious question -but that the availability
of the insurance coverage acts as a definite inducement to plaintiffs
in electing their remedies. This has been implicitly recognized in
Rule 26(b) (2) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and
in the corresponding federal discovery provision, -9 which allow dis-
covery of the nature and extent of insurance coverage.
There can be little doubt that this consideration enters in as a
conscious motivation on the part of many plaintiffs' lawyers in de-
termining whether to proceed for punitive damages. Kenneth M.
Moran, in his presentation during the 1976 annual meeting of the
State Bar Association of North Dakota observed:
Plaintiffs are seeking (and getting) more "smart" money
now than ever before. While it may be tempting to seek pun-
itive damages in certain cases, the pleader should bear in
mind that his eventual victory may be Pyrrhic. Defendant's
carrier will likely claim the willful misconduct, malicious
acts, etc. complained of are not covered by the insurance
contract, and will deny coverage.
There is no doubt that the same motivation which has brought
to the class action plaintiff the appellation "private attorney general"
is legitimate consideration in weighing the public policy aspects of
punitive damage coverage.
Several courts have observed that it is not proper to exclude
coverage on the basis that the conduct was judged as punitive be-
cause there is often a very fine line between conduct which will be
judged as simple negligence and that which will be judged as grounds
for a punitive award.91
The court in Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.
argued:
The line of demarcation between the allowance of puni-
tive damages and compensatory only is too thin and exact-
ing in my opinion to apply coverage in the one case and deny
coverage in the other. Verdicts of juries are unpredictable.
92
In ai similar vein, Judge Gewin in his concurring opinion in
Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty argued that whether
89. F.R. Cmy. P. 26(b) (2).
90. Kenneth M. Moran, Trial Practice in North Dakota--Random Observations 3, State
Bar Ass'n. of N.D. Annual Meeting, CLE Program, Bismarck, North Dakota (June 1976).
91. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 828
(4th Cir. 1957) ; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734
(1935) Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 532
(1969) Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho
501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973) ; Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 3S3
S.W.2d 1 (1964).
92. 214 Tenn. 639, 653, 383 S.WA.2d 1, 7 (1964).
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conduct was intentional or unintentional ought to be the basis on
which coverage is extended or denied:
The more appropriate basis upon which to hold that pub-
lic policy prohibits insurance against liability is the nature
of the conduct of the wrongdoer-not the nature of the dam-
ages awarded. If the defendant acted willfully, intentionally,
maliciously or fraudulently, coverage should be denied; be-
cause, in such circumstances, he should not be able to avoid
punishment by shifting the penalty to an insurance carrier. I
doubt that such protection is ever afforded by insurance, be-
cause the companies who are experienced in such matters
and who write the contracts, expressly exclude such conduct
from the protection afforded by the policy. 93
Judge Gewin made a good point. Punitive damages are awarded
on the basis of conduct which spans a considerable gray area of
culpability. The existence of intent to harm is a measure somewhat
more susceptible to uniform application.
Furthermore if, as Judge Gewin suggested, the determining fac-
tor should be the conduct of the wrongdoer, and not the nature of
the damages, this would suggest an additional defect in the approach
of those courts denying coverage of punitive damages.
Those courts allow coverage of compensatory damages, but not
of punitive damages caused by unintentional conduct. In effect then,
even those courts denying coverage on public policy grounds are ap-
parently doing so not because the conduct of the wrongdoer requires
it, but because they do not believe the damages themselves should
be covered. There is an inconsistency in this reasoning.
The deterrent purpose of punitive damage is the other major
foundation for the policy arguments against coverage. Many courts,
likewise, reject this as a proper ground for denial of coverage, tak-
ing direct issue with the proposition that punitive damages have a
substantial deterrent effect.
0 4
In all of these cases it is observed that despite a substantial
body of criminal law relating to wrongful conduct in the operation
of automobiles, drivers have not been substantially deterred from
that conduct.
Even so, the court in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones
argued, the existence or nonexistence of coverage for punitive dam-
ages does not, realistically speaking, have a general tendency to af-
fect conduct sought to be discouraged by punitive damages:
93. 27 F.2d 432, 445 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. New Amsterdanm Cas. C,,. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) : Price v. Hartfrd
Accident & Inden . Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 r'.2d 522 (1972); Abbie Urigun Oldsmobile
Buick, Inc. v. United Stats Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Lazenby
%'. Univer.al Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
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By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the
shooting, or unlawful conduct, could have been previously with-
in the contemplation of Jones at the time he procured the
policy insuring himself against accidents suffered by others
on his premises. The execution of the policy did not place
a premium on the wrongful assault. It did not arouse illegal
temptation. Viewed from a common sense standpoint, neither
the contract, nor a recovery thereunder by Martin can be
held to be against public policy.9 5
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co. observed that the same general type of
argument once was applied to the question of whether one might
insure against negligent conduct:
In the early years of the casualty insurance business it
was argued by some that by allowing one to insure against
his own negligent acts that carelessness would be encour-
aged, resulting in increased injuries and deaths on the high-
ways. Regardless of the soundness of this idea, the insurance
industry has grown and prospered and has become a stable
part of our economy.96
Certainly, very few courts today would seriously suggest that
one is more likely to engage in negligent and injurious conduct, sim-
ply because he is insured against it. The argument makes no more
sense simply because the level of culpability is greater. It would ap-
pear that the reliance upon the argument of deterrence is based as
much on emotional grounds as on logical grounds.
This would seem to be reinforced by the fact that many com-
panies now sell "personal injury" protection which, in addition to
"bodily injury" protection, extends coverage to such quasi-intentional
torts as libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false
imprisonment.97
At least two cases have involved the question of whether an em-
ployer may be insured for punitive damages applied vicariously only
and have determined that public policy does not apply where the
employer himself took no part in the wrong.98
Dean Prosser observed that the majority of courts considering
vicarious liability for punitive damages have ruled that an employer
is responsible for punitive damages incurrred as a result of acts of
an employee within the scope of his employment. 99
95. 135 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1943).
96. 214 Tenn. 639, 652, 383 S.W.2d 1, 7 (1964).
97. NATIONAL UNDERWRITERS ASS'N., Public Liability, in FIRE, CAS. & SuR. BULLS. §
Pi-1 (May 1968).
98. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 734 (1935) ; Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969).
99. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 12 (4th ed. 1965).
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This raises another interesting point. Apparently the majority of
courts find little difficulty on the public policy ground with the shift-
ing of responsibility for punitive damages from the wrongdoer to the
innocent employer. Yet, some of these same courts base their rejec-
tion of insurance coverage on the principle that responsibility for
wrongful conduct ought not to be shifted from the original wrongdoer
to an innocent party, namely the insurance company. 10° There is no
reason that the courts ought to apply the public policy arguments
differently, depending on whether the innocent third party is an em-
ployer or an insurance company.
Several of the courts which have allowed coverage of punitive
damages have found not only that there exists no valid public policy
prohibiting coverage, but have affirmatively argued that public policy
ought to require coverage in the absence of a specific exclusion. t 0 '
In Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the court found
a countervailing public policy, that the company ought not to be able
to avoid its contractual obligations:
Sixth, the State of Arizona has more than one public pol-
icy. Such policy appears in many fields. One such public pol-
icy is that an insurance company which admittedly took a pre-
mium for covering all liability for damages, should honor its
obligation.1
°2
Several courts have also found that in addition to the purpose
of punitive damages to punish and deter the wrongdoer, such dam-
ages also constitute a benefit to the claimant, and a benefit in which
the claimant has a legitimate interest which public policy ought to
protect. 103
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, the court stated:
Furthermore, it is obvious that the policy was not a mere
simple contract between the company and Jones. The issuance
of insurance policies, the business of insurance companies,
and the rights of injured parties where there exists liability
insurance, are permeated with a public interest; and such
parties, under many circumstances, have rights, superior and
greater than the insured, against the insurer.
10 4
100. Compare Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (Sth Cii. 1934), cert.
denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935) with Crull ,. Gleb, 382 S W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
101. Price v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 10S Ariz. 4S5, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) ; Dairyland
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
102. 108 Ariz. 485, - , 502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972).
103. Northwestern Nat'l. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 44 45 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Gewin, J., specially concurring) Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Atut. Cat. Ins.
Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135
F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ii. App. 133, 245 N.E.2d 124
(1969).
104. 135 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir. 1943).
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Judge Gewin, in his special concurrence in Northwestern Na-
tional Casualty Co. v. McNulty, asked:
What about the injured party? Implicit in the entire field
of tort liability and insurance law is the concept of furnish-
ing some protection to those who are injured. Public policy
is involved here to a greater extent. What will society do
with the thousands who are injured daily and to some of
whom punitive damages are awarded. 15
While it may be argued by some that punitive damages are not
designed to compensate, the fact remains that in North Dakota, and
most other states, neither are compensatory damages designed to
fully compensate. The innocent victim must still reduce his compen-
sation by his attorney's fees and nontaxable expenses of litigation,
and must still endure the strain of litigation, in order to secure his
right to compensation.
To say that the claimant has no legitimate interest in the recov-
ery of punitive damages because he has been fully compensated is
to exult form over substance and to ignore the realities of life.
This is specifically recognized in the states where courts have
held that expenses of litigation or attorney's fees may legitimately
be considered in assessing punitive damages.', There can be no ques-
tion but that these factors are legitimate practical considerations in
the award of punitive damages in other states, as well, even though
they may not be so recognized by the law.
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals pointed out that in many cases the claimant may be re-
garded as a third-party beneficiary of an insurance policy and may
have a right to proceed directly against the company for benefits
under the contract.
107
In the case of Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wall-
gren,'0 ' the court held that the public policy of Texas actually re-
quired coverage of punitive damages under the Texas financial re-
sponsibility law. 10 9 The court observed that the financial responsibility
statute of Texas required that the company provide coverage for all
liability imposed by law and that punitive damage was a liability
imposed by law. 10
This is a position which could arguably be taken by North Da-
kota, following the recent case of Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co.' In that case, the North Dakota Supreme Court
105. 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 191;2).
106. Tedesco V. M,,ylaud Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
107. 135 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir. 1943).
10S. 477 S.V.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
109. Id. at 342-43.
110. Id. at 343.
111. 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975).
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held that all insurance policies written in the State of North Dakota,
whether or not certified for financial responsibility, must provide
minimum coverage, including coverage for "liability imposed . . .
by law. ' ' 112 The court ruled that because this language was statutor-
ily mandated, it must be literally applied.
11 3
Finally, the court in Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wallgren14 and the concurring opinion of Justice White in Lazenby,"'
raised an interesting argument, that the policy provisions extending
coverage to punitive damages have been approved by the insurance
commissioner of the state and are, therefore, in accordance with the
public policy of the state. In Dairyland, the court said:
In United States Ins. Co. of Waco v. Boyer, it was ob-
served: "it is unlawful to issue a policy in words other than
those expressly approved by the Insurance Commission. .. .
Our conclusion is that terms and conditions set out in
the insurance contract before us-having been prescribed and
approved by the Insurance Commission-accord with and re-
present the public policy of the state. Stated another way:
the terms and conditions of the policy do not contravene pub-
lic policy.",,
VII. CONCLUSION
It appears that there is neither a clear line of authority, nor
any clearly discernible trend of authority as to the question of wheth-
er or not punitive damages are covered under a general public lia-
bility policy.
Neither does there appear to be any clear indication of North
Dakota's current position on the issue. North Dakota's case of Yesel
v. Watson'" 7 was decided nearly fifty years ago when the courts were
generally more conservative and specifically when the makeup of
the North Dakota Supreme Court was substantially different from
today. That case is further limited in its applicability by the fact
that it involved a state bonding fund, and not a private contract
for public liability insurance.
There would appear to be a substantial possibility that North
Dakota would favor coverage under a public liability policy. The re-
cent cases of Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co." 8 and Lovas v. St. Paul Insurance Cos." 9 would indicate a fair-
112. Id. at 886.
113. Id.
114. 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tev. Civ. App. 1972).
115. 214 Tenn. 649, 383 S.W.2d 7 (1964).
116. 477 S.V.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
117. 58 N.D. 524, 226 N.W. 624 (1929).
11S. 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975).
119. 240 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1976).
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ly clear trend towards requiring broader insurance coverages under
North Dakota law.
Although the courts which have considered the question of pub-
lic policy are more or less evenly split, the better reasoning supports
coverage.
Nonetheless, the issue has rather substantial public policy impli-
cations. Moreover, it is a matter which substantially affects the rights
of not only insurers and insureds contracting for public liability cov-
erage within the state, but also of claimants under policies for pub-
lic liability coverage. The matter assumes even greater significance
in view of the current trend toward the punitive damage award
and the increased recognition of both insured and third-party rights
in insurance litigation.
One way or the other, this is an issue which ought to be resolv-
ed. Hopefully, this article will help in clarifying the legitimate pub-
lic policy considerations which exist both for and against the exten-
sion of coverage, and aid in that resolution.
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